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SYMPOSIUM: SHOULD THERE BE AN
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY?.
AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Surya Prakash Sinhat
Nuremberg is the image that flicks in the vision when we
think about an international tribunal for crimes against hu-
manity. In Nuremberg, by an Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis,' the victors of the Second World War brought their wrath
upon the vanquished for the horrible deeds of the latter. They
established a Tribunal for the trial of War Criminals. There
were prosecutions and punishments for Crimes Against Peace,
War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity. Crimes Against
Humanity were enumerated as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other in-
humane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the do-
mestic law of the country where perpetrated.2
t Professor of Law, Pace University; Associate of Columbia University's Sem-
inar on the Problem of Peace, 1969 - present.
1 Agreement for the Prosecution Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, U.S.-Fr.-U.K-Gr. Brit.-N. Ir.-U.S.S.R., 59 Stat.
1544.
2 Id. at 1547 Article 6 (c) of the charter, annexed to the Agreement. The In-
ternational Law Commission's 1950 Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles has
rightly dropped the war predicate of Article 6 (c). U.N. Doc. A/CN/.4/25 (1950).
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Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy
to commit any of these crimes were made responsible for acts
performed by any persons in the execution of such a plan.
These crimes initiated prosecutions and punishments. In
order to maintain the integrity of these prosecutions, fine prin-
ciples of evidence and due process were practiced. International
legal literature devoted its energy in elaborating what came to
be called the Nuremberg Principles. The International Law
Commission developed, in 1950, a formulation of the Nurem-
berg Principles and prepared a Draft Code of Offenses Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind.3 It seemed as if we were
just about to see the emergence of a general and concordance
practice of states (usus diuturnus) with respect to international
punishment of the Nuremberg crimes which, accompanied by
the conviction of states that they were bound in law by these
Principles (opinio juris sive necessitatis), would yield a custom-
ary principle of international law. Enthusiastic proclamations
were made that such horrendous deeds deserved not merely
moral condemnation of humanity but punishment as well by the
international law of that humanity. However, even at the very
beginning, the application of these Principles was selective, not
general. They were applied to acts of Germany but not to acts of
the Allied Powers, such as the bombing of Dresden. When occa-
sions arose for application of these high Principles against their
founding fathers, for example, in Vietnam, these Principles
were nowhere to be found in the practice of states. Therefore,
despite all their inspirational power, the Nuremberg Principles
never passed the twin tests of usus diuturnus and opinio juris
sive necessitatis for the creation of a principle of international
law.
Some of the Nuremberg sentiment was given the legally
binding force of a treaty. An example is the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 4 This
Convention was approved unanimously by the United Nations
3 Id. In 1987, the name of the code was changed to Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Report of International Law Commis-
sion, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 145, U.N. Doe. A/43/10 (1988).
4 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, Austl.-Bulg.-Cambodia-Ceylone-Czech., 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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General Assembly on December 9, 1948 and came into effect on
January 12, 1951.5 It provided for the punishment of persons
committing genocide and related crimes, whether they were
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private
individuals. The contracting parties undertook to enact neces-
sary legislation for effective penalties. The accused persons
were to be tried either by a tribunal of the state where the crime
was committed or by an international penal tribunal. Although
an international penal tribunal never came to be created, the
Genocide Convention did become binding law. However that
convention was dumped in the heap of dead-letter law as geno-
cide proceeded in Tibet, or Vietnam, or Cambodia, or Iraq, or
Bosnia.
Early this year, Bosnia-Herzegovina invoked the Genocide
Convention in its suit against Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)
before the International Court Of Justice. The Court issued a
Provisional Measure on April 8, 1993 and ordered Yugoslavia to
take all measures to prevent the crime of genocide.6 However,
as Judge Schwebel of the World Court pointed out, Court Or-
ders in this case were no more effective than the Security Coun-
cil Resolutions. 7 In May of this year, an International Tribunal
was set up to expiate the conscience of Powers-that-run-the-
world.8 Their conscience must bite because they did not do any-
5 The provisions of the Convention are now contained in the International
Law Commission's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
6 International Court of Justice: Order on Request For the Indication Of Pro-
visional Measures In Case Concerning Application Of The Convention On The Pre-
vention And Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 32 I.L.M. 888 (1993), United Nations: Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution And Declaration On The Rights Of Persons Belonging To
National Or Ethnic, Religious And Linguistic Minorities, 32 I.L.M. 911 (1993).
7 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) 1993 I.C.J. 29 (April
16).
8 United Nations Security Council Resolution 827, Adopted on 25 May 1993.
On September 17, 1993, eleven judges were elected by the U.N. General Assembly,
for a four-year term beginning November 17, 1993, to this International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991. These judges are Georges Michel Abi-Saab (Egypt), Antonio Cassese (Italy),
Jules Deschenes (Canada), Adolphus Godwin Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria), Germain Le
Foyer De Costil (France), Li Haopei (China), Abrielle Kirk McDonald (U.S.), Eliza-
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thing to prevent the crime when they could have done so. If
these powers did not intervene to stop the leaders and heads of
states from committing their act, they are not going to capture
them and bring them to trial before the Tribunal. One can only
expect that the Tribunal's court calendar will be filled by scape-
goats.
It is in the world as sketched above that we raise our ques-
tion: Should there be an international tribunal for crimes
against humanity?
Therefore, our question issues from several naivet6.
It issues from the naivete of locating itself in a world in
which a piece of humanity had just bled from genocide while the
Powers capable of preventing it did little more than inventing
the new vocabulary of the ethnic cleansing.
It issues from the naivet6 of witnessing the creation of the
new Tribunal for Bosnia as an artifice for conscience cleansing
of these powers, who need a mollification for their inaction
when that action was desperately needed.
It issues from the naivete of wondering if there is the polit-
ical will in the Powers-that-run-the-world to capture the lead-
ers, heads of states, and high officials and bring them to trial
before an international tribunal.
It issues from the naivet6 of asking for an international tri-
bunal to be possessed of a world-wide jurisdiction in the face of
the entrenched tradition of being highly selective, such as using
it in Germany but not in Tibet, or Vietnam, or Cambodia or
Iraq.
It issues from the naivet6 of the cry of humankind for recog-
nition of its humanity in a system of states.
Therefore, should there be an international tribunal for
crimes against humanity? The questions that arise are: (1) Is
the Nuremberg definition of crimes against humanity suffi-
cient? (2) Since such a tribunal of general jurisdictions will
have to be created by a treaty, is there a willingness among
states to enter into such a treaty and put high officials of their
government under the jurisdiction of such a tribunal? (3) How
are the leaders, heads of states, and high officials to be captured
beth Odio Benito (Costa Rica), Rustam S. Sidhwa (Pakistan), Sir Ninian Stephen
(Australia), and Lal Chand Vohrah (Malaysia).
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and brought before it for trial? (4) What modes of punishment
are possible, given the conflicting practices of punishment
among states whereunder, for example, some states practices
capital punishment and others prohibit it?
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